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In the Wake of Thoreau: Four Modem Legal




It has been well over a century since Henry David Thoreau's
influential essay On the Duty of Civil Disobedience' first appeared
in print. What philosophy of civil disobedience did Thoreau ex-
press in that essay, and how does it compare with the theories of
modem legal philosophers on the subject? An exploration of these
issues is the purpose of this Article.
This Article opens with a discussion of Thoreau's philosophy of
civil disobedience and then examines the ideas of four modem legal
philosophers, Joseph Raz, Kent Greenawalt, John Rawls, and
Ronald Dworkin, on the subject. Next, the Article compares the
respective thinking of all five men regarding the circumstances that
would justify the use of civil disobedience. To facilitate the com-
parison as well as to make it more relevant to the reader, the Arti-
cle examines five related contemporary illustrations involving
situations in which the use of civil disobedience might arguably be
morally justified. This Article concludes with some general
thoughts on the circumstances justifying the use of nonviolent civil
disobedience.
The scope of this essay should be clarified. It is not this author's
intent here to treat all possible forms of civil disobedience. For ex-
ample, except in passing, violence as a form of civil disobedience
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1. HENRY D. THOREAU, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, reprinted in WALDEN 85
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and possible justifications for its use will not be considered.2 Nor,
except in passing, will conscientious objection or refusal to serve in
war be discussed.3 While such issues are important and relevant to
the topic addressed, their discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article's more modest endeavor. Finally, the Article does not
claim to assert a new theory of nonviolent civil disobedience. In-
stead, the primary intention is to survey the philosophy of some,
but by no means all, influential thinkers on a matter that has long
been an important topic of public debate in the United States.
II. FIVE PHILOSOPHERS ON NONVIOLENT CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE
Henry David Thoreau has significantly influenced American
thinking on nonviolent civil disobedience. While he does not pres-
ent a full-blown, scholarly theory of civil disobedience, his position
as an early writer and thinker on the subject, as well as his role as
an early civil disobedient, make Thoreau's views both important to
examine and interesting in their own right.
Joseph Raz, Kent Greenawalt, John Rawls, and Ronald Dwor-
kin, all of whom are important contemporary legal philosophers,
have written about nonviolent civil disobedience, generally in con-
nection with such matters as the role of law in society, the theory
of a legal system, and the place of individual rights.4 An examina-
tion of each man's thinking regarding nonviolent civil disobedience
will distinguish the four philosophers, as well as Thoreau, and pro-
vide the foundation for some general conclusions about the circum-
stances in which such disobedience may be morally justifiable.,
A. Henry David Thoreau
The catalyst for Henry David Thoreau's essay On the Duty of
Civil Disobedience was the author's purposeful failure to pay his
poll tax 6 in his hometown of Concord, Massachusetts, resulting in
2. See infra notes 52-53, 145 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 41, 134.
4. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (1979); Kent Greenawalt, A Con-
textual Approach to Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1970) [hereinafter Greenawalt,
Disobedience]; KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY (1987) [here-
inafter GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); RON-
ALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
5. See infra part III.
6. The poll tax was not a tax levied on the right to vote, as its name might imply in a
more modem context, but was a per capita tax levied on all males between the ages of 20
and 70. WALTER HARDING, THE DAYS OF HENRY THOREAU 200 (1965).
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a one-night stint in the local jail.7 Thoreau's omission was a self-
styled act of civil disobedience aimed at protesting the United
States government's support of slavery' and the war between the
United States and Mexico. 9
As expressed in his essay, Thoreau's philosophy of civil disobedi-
ence toward government is highly individualistic and libertarian.
A major recurring theme is Thoreau's desire to be left alone by the
government. The essay begins with a nod to Thomas Jefferson: "I
heartily accept the motto,-'That government is best which gov-
erns least;' and... 'That government is best which governs not at
all;' and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of
7. Id. at 199.
8. Thoreau was not the first Concordian to refuse to pay his poll tax as a protest
against slavery. Bronson Alcott had done so three years earlier and had also been ar-
rested for his refusal. Despite Alcott's pleas, his wife's family paid the tax on his behalf,
both in that year and in subsequent years, in order to spare the family the embarrassment
of having one of their own serve time in jail. See id. at 200-02.
9. The story of Thoreau's night spent in jail is legendary. One July evening in 1846,
Thoreau was approached by Sam Staples, the local constable, tax collector, and jailer,
who asked Thoreau about his poll tax and reminded him that, as the tax was seriously
delinquent, Thoreau might have to be arrested if he persisted in his failure to pay.
Thoreau had not paid his poll tax for several years, but Staples, having given the writer
several warnings, had overlooked these previous failures. This time, Staples offered to
intervene with the town's selectmen in order to have the tax reduced if Thoreau thought
it too high; Staples even offered to pay the tax for Thoreau. The latter declined, respond-
ing that his refusal to pay was a matter of principle and that if Staples were going to
arrest him, he could do so now. Staples thereupon complied with Thoreau's request, and
Thoreau spent the night in jail.
Thoreau had extracted a promise from his mother not to interfere with his protest by
paying the poll tax on his behalf. A heavily veiled woman, thought to be his Aunt Maria,
paid the tax in the middle of the night without Thoreau's knowledge or approval, most
likely to save the family from the indignity of having a member jailed. Annually, thereaf-
ter, either Thoreau's Aunt Maria or another relative paid his poll tax so that he would
not be arrested again.
When morning came, Staples came to Thoreau's cell to release him; the prisoner was
angry at having had his tax paid, thus cutting short his protest against slavery and the
government that supported that institution. Initially, Thoreau refused to leave his cell,
but Staples was insistent. After his release, Thoreau immediately set about to complete
the errand, a visit to the local shoemaker, in which he had been engaged at the time of his
arrest on the previous night. Id. at 199-206.
According to Harding, so many of Thoreau's fellow Concordians wanted to know why
he had been jailed that he explained his reasons in a lecture delivered on January 28,
1848, at the Concord Lyceum. The lecture was successful enough to merit repetition
three weeks later. In 1849, Elizabeth Peabody asked for Thoreau's permission to publish
the text of the lecture in her new periodical, Aesthetic Papers. In response, Thoreau sent
her the manuscript of the lecture, which was published under the title Resistance to Civil
Government. The essay received its present title, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, only
when it was collected and published along with some of his other works in 1866, four
years after Thoreau's death. Id. at 206-07.
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government which they will have.""° Thoreau's calls, almost anar-
chical, appear to be for the abolition of government. Thoreau dis-
tinguishes himself from "no-government men," however, by
demanding "at once a better government" rather than no
government. I'
What constitutes "a better government"? Thoreau theorizes
that a truly free and enlightened state would acknowledge the peo-
ple as the source of its authority and treat them accordingly. 12 For
Thoreau, a better government is one which would be more just and
one which would be more likely to leave him alone. Citizens
should live simply so that there would be less need for the state's
services and protection and, by extension, less need for government
itself.13  Without the need for services and protection, people
would be within their rights not to support the state.14 Thoreau's
constant refrain is the desire to be left alone.
Another major theme is justice. Thoreau's improved state
would "be just to all men" and "treat the individual with respect as
a neighbor."' 5 Unfortunately, "[lI]aw never made men a whit more
just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed
are daily made the agents of injustice.' 6 Under an unjust govern-
ment, "the true place for a just man is also a prison.""
In Thoreau's estimation, the government's injustice stemmed
primarily from its perpetration of an unjust foreign war and more
10. THOREAU, supra note 1, at 85.
11. Id. at 86. Thoreau goes on to call for "every man [to] make known what kind of
government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it."
Id. These "better government" views appear to contradict directly Thoreau's "no gov-
ernment" statement noted immediately above. See supra text accompanying note 10.
12. THOREAU, supra note 1, at 104. Thoreau further states:
I please myself with imagining a State at last which can afford to be just to all
men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would
not think it inconsistent with its own repose, if a few were to live aloof from it,
not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neigh-
bors and fellow-men.
Id.
13. Id. at 95-96.
14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 104.
16. Id. at 86. The "injustice" to which Thoreau refers is, presumably, the injustice of
the then-existing government, which sustained the institution of slavery and which, at the
time of Thoreau's refusal to pay his poll tax, was fighting what Thoreau believed to be an
unjust war in Mexico.
17. Id. at 94. "The proper place to-day, the only place which Massachusetts has
provided for her freer and less desponding spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and
locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their
principles," continues Thoreau. Id.
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importantly, its support of slavery.' The federal government thus
had lost its legitimacy, not only because it would not leave Thoreau
alone, but also because it engaged in an unjust foreign war and
supported slavery. The Massachusetts state government had also
lost its legitimacy because, as part of the federal system, it sup-
ported the federal government.1 9
What should be done about such injustice? According to
Thoreau, unjust laws should be resisted2" because people best serve
an unjust government by resisting it. 2' If they will not or cannot
change the wrongs perpetrated by the state, people at least have the
duty to avoid supporting the government through the payment of
taxes.22
Thoreau disdains voting as a means of effecting change and be-
rates those who do nothing more than vote-who "in opinion" op-
pose slavery and war "yet in effect do nothing to put an end to
them."' 23 Citizens should "break the law" if the injustice inherent
in government requires its citizens to be agents of injustice to
others.24  The problem with the state's method of remedying
injustice (presumably the majoritarian political process, though
Thoreau never makes that explicit) is that these methods "take too
much time, and a man's life will be gone. "25 Citizens, then, should
18. THOREAU, supra note 1, at 88. Thoreau states:
I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government
which is the slave's government also.
... [W]hen a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be
the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and
conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not
too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize.
Id.
19. Thoreau's references in his essay to the "government" are often rather general
and could apply equally to the federal as well as the state government. As a result, it is
sometimes difficult to determine exactly how Thoreau intended to apportion his blame
between the two governments. Perhaps Thoreau did not himself have a precise notion of
how to apportion such blame.
Remember that the poll tax which Thoreau refused to pay was due and payable not to
the federal government, but to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Thus, Thoreau's
protest affected the United States government only indirectly.
20. THOREAU, supra note 1, at 92.
21. Id. at 87.
22. Id. at 91-92.
23. Id. at 89.
24. Id. at 92. As Thoreau states, "[let your life be a counter friction to stop the
machine [i.e., the government]. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend
myself to the wrong which I condemn." Id.
25. Id. Thoreau poses the issue as follows:
Unjust laws exist; shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to
amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 24
not wait for the political process to work but, instead, should resist
their government, should refuse to support it through their taxes,
and should encourage its officials to resign their offices in order to
further the cause of civil disobedience.26 Almost incredibly,
Thoreau states that he would like to conform and to pay his taxes,
but that he needs a reason to do so and has not, as yet, found one.27
Throughout his essay, Thoreau appeals to a higher law.28 An
authority higher than the Constitution and higher even than the
Bible exists for Thoreau. That authority is the Ultimate Source,
the Supreme Being,2 9 and Thoreau bemoans the fact that legisla-
tors do not consult that higher source for guidance in, and as a
check on, their actions.30
them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they
ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think
that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil .... Why is it
[i.e., the state] not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it
not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why
does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its fault, and do
better than it would have them?
Id.
26. THOREAU, supra note 1, at 94. Typically, Thoreau makes the case in passionate
prose:
If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a
violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to
commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a
peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other
public officer, asks me, as one has done, "But what shall I do?" my answer is,
"If you really wish to do any thing, resign your office." When the subject has
refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is
accomplished.
Id. The "tax-gatherer," whom he advises to resign, is presumably Sam Staples.
27. Id. at 101. Thoreau explains,
I seek rather, I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land.
I am but too ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect myself
on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself
disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State governments,
and the spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for conformity.
Id.
28. For example, Thoreau appeals to this higher law regarding the slavery issue:
I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should
at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from
the government of Massachusetts and not wait till they constitute a majority of
one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is
enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one.
Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one
already.
Id. at 93.
29. Id. at 103.
30. Id. In this regard, Thoreau notes that "[flor eighteen hundred years, though
perchance I have no right to say it, the New Testament has been written; yet where is the
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Thoreau's essay contains contradictions and impracticalities.
For example, Thoreau calls for resistance to government, yet also
asks to be left alone by government and to be allowed to live apart
from it. How can one resist or change government if one simply
withdraws and lives apart from it? Thoreau never explains this
apparent contradiction. Moreover, he appeals to a higher author-
ity on those occasions when such appeals are convenient. Yet, he
never fully develops or integrates a theory of higher or natural law
with his call for civil disobedience.31 Furthermore, however ap-
pealing they might seem in theory, Thoreau's libertarian calls for
the least quantum of government are simply impractical in today's
complex society.32
After languishing in relative obscurity for decades, Thoreau's
political philosophy of civil disobedience, replete with its inherent
inconsistencies and paradoxes, found new followers in this nation's
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. 33 "It would be diffi-
cult to overemphasize how much Thoreau's 'Civil Disobedience'
legislator who has wisdom and practical talent enough to avail himself of the light which
it sheds on the science of legislation?" Id. Assuming that God is the "Ultimate source"
of the New Testament, Thoreau fails to explain the inconsistency apparent here-i.e.,
how can God and the Bible somehow be different sources? Nor does he suggest how one
might know God's general wishes other than through the Bible.
31. Robert B. Downs notes that "higher moral law, [as interpreted by Thoreau, im-
plies that] individual conscience ... should prevail against the dictates of government."
ROBERT B. DOWNS, State Versus Individual: Henry David Thoreau 's Resistance to Civil
Government, in BOOKS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 78, 80 (1970).
32. Downs, while admitting that Thoreau's "extreme liberalism... glorifies individ-
ual free will, isolates the citizen from society, ard frees him from all social and civic
duties," nonetheless defends Thoreau's extreme philosophy as containing fundamental
truth. "It is the citizen's duty to fight injustice in society, to do his share to ensure that
unjustices [sic] are not perpetuated or created by the state." Id. at 84.
See also LEO STOLLER, Civil Disobedience: Principle and Politics, in THOREAU IN OUR
SEASON 40 (John H. Hicks ed., 1966). By the time of the Civil War, notes Stoller, the
changed (and, presumably, in Thoreau's view, better) government of Abraham Lincoln
did command Thoreau's support. Id. at 41. Stoller considers Thoreau's resistance to the
state, as embodied in Thoreau's refusal to pay his poll tax, to be "an act of desperation,
chosen because political circumstances had not yet allowed him a more effective one."
Id.
33. MICHAEL MEYER, SEVERAL MORE LIVES TO LIVE: THOREAU'S POLITICAL
REPUTATION IN AMERICA 153-54 (1977). Meyer notes:
Henry David Thoreau had a friend in Rosa Parks, and, more directly, a disciple
in Martin Luther King. ...
King was one of the first members of the civil rights movement to cite
Thoreau as an inspiration and an ally, and as King gradually gained promi-
nence in the movement so did Thoreau.... [B]efore King there had never been
a highly visible, popular movement to sustain the connection [between Thoreau
and civil rights] so that "Civil Disobedience" would be perceived as relevant to
a large number of contemporary Americans.
1992]
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was in the air in the early sixties for those involved in protest
groups or interested in them," observes one writer. 34 The individu-
alist, libertarian nineteenth century philosopher found a new audi-
ence, over a century later, for his strongly felt, if often impractical
and self-contradictory, views on civil disobedience.
B. Joseph Raz
By asserting, in The Authority of the Law, that "there is no obli-
gation to obey the law even in a good society whose legal system is
just," 35  Joseph Raz arguably appears even more radical than
Thoreau. While persons may have "moral"3
6 or "prudential" 37
reasons to obey the law, there is, in Raz's view, no general moral
obligation to obey the law.3" If a person does "respect" the law (in
spite of the absence of any general requirement that one, in fact,
have such respect), then such respect in and of itself provides that
person with a general reason for obeying the law.39 Even those
who have respect for the law or who possess some moral, pruden-
34. Id. at 157. Meyer points out that, while Thoreau's reputation is as a proponent of
peaceful civil disobedience, he was later interested in violent resistance to slavery, as ad-
vocated by John Brown. According to Meyer, Thoreau's support of violent resistance to
slavery has largely been overlooked, because nonviolent resistance is more socially ac-
ceptable. Meyer asserts that:
the image of Thoreau as a pacifist is more useful than his image as a reformer
who is willing, at least on paper, not only to die but also to kill for a cause.
Official sanction was awarded Thoreau as a pacifist, but his support of Brown's
violence was officially ignored.
Id. at 160.
In the late 1960s, protests against the Vietnam war and in favor of increased equal
opportunity became more violent. There was something of a backlash against Thoreau at
that time, as some writers identified with the political establishment saw that the philoso-
pher's views on civil disobedience could naturally lead to violent resistance to the law.
Id. at 179-84. However, Meyer asserts that he is unaware of any academic literary critic
"who in print either vigorously endorsed Thoreau's views on violence in the later essays
or who insisted that they were relevant and useful for solving the problems faced by the
civil rights or the antiwar movements of the sixties .. " Id. at 188.
35. RAZ, supra note 4, at 233. This view is in contrast to that of Rawls on the issue of
the duty to obey the law in a reasonably just society. See infra notes 123-28 and accom-
panying text.
36. RAz, supra note 4, at 237.
37. Id. at 242. These "prudential reasons" include the risk of incurring legal or social
sanctions (or both). Id. at 242-43.
38. Id. at 242. For Raz, prudential reasons to obey the law "do not provide an ade-
quate foundation for an obligation to obey the law"; they "do not in themselves give rise
to moral obligations." Id. at 244.
39. Id. at 250. Raz summarizes his thoughts regarding the obligation to obey the law
as follows:
There is no general moral obligation to obey it, not even in a good society. It is
permissible to have no general moral attitude to the law, to reserve one's judg-
ment and examine each situation as it arises. But in all but iniquitous societies
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tial, or other reason for obeying it may, under some circumstances,
have a moral right to break the law.'
Raz defines civil disobedience as "a politically motivated breach
of law designed either to contribute directly to a change of law or
of a public policy or to express one's protest against, and dissoca-
tion [sic] from, a law or a public policy."4 1 Civil disobedience,
then, is a public action intended to have a political effect.4 2 The
definition does not require, however, that the civilly disobedient
actor be willing to submit to punishment for his or her act.13 Ac-
cording to Raz, while the civilly disobedient act itself must be pub-
lic (i.e., the occurrence of the act and the motivation behind it must
be made known to the public), the actor need not voluntarily sub-
mit to punishment or even make known his or her identity."
Raz distinguishes between his assertions that civil disobedience
is sometimes "right" and that "one has, under certain conditions, a
right to [engage in] civil disobedience."" 5 The latter assertion
means that given those certain conditions, one has a right to en-
gage in civil disobedience "even though one should not do so" in
some normative sense."6 This semantic difference has been the
source of some confusion regarding the propriety of engaging in
civil disobedience in various circumstances.47
it is equally permissible to have "practical" respect for the law. For one who
thus respects the law his respect itself is a reason for obeying the law.
Id. at 260.
40. Id. at 262. Raz notes that he "assume[s] that if there is such a moral right then
there is a presumption for giving it legal recognition." Id. Indeed, this is an important
assumption.
41. RAz, supra note 4, at 263. In so defining "civil disobedience," Raz distinguishes
it from, on the one hand, what he terms "revolutionary disobedience" (disobedience
aimed at changing the government) and, on the other hand, "conscientious objection"
(breach of law resulting from a moral prohibition against the actor's obedience to the
law). Id. Raz admits that these categories may overlap and that the definitions them-
selves, while being "useful classification[s] of certain cases of disobedience," are not ex-
haustive nor do they necessarily "represent the ordinary meaning of the defined terms."
Id. at 264.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 265.
44. Id. Compare Greenawalt's views on this point, infra notes 90-91, 116-18 and
accompanying text. Greenawalt, in citing an example of a disobedient flouting Nazi law
in order to save Jews from extermination, notes that such an act's effectiveness requires
secrecy. This difference may be largely definitional, though, for while Greenawalt may
label such an act "civil disobedience", Raz would probably classify it as a private act of
"conscientious objection." See RAz, supra note 4, at 263.
45. RAz, supra note 4, at 267.
46. Id.
47. Compare Dworkin's discussion on a civil disobedient "right" to break the law,
infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
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Raz believes that some writers on the subject of civil disobedi-
ence have invested great intellectual effort in their attempts to de-
fine permissible forms of civil disobedience. 8 Other writers, he
says, have typically placed several limitations on permissible forms
of civil disobedience: (1) it should only be employed after all other
means have failed; (2) it must be nonviolent; (3) it must be under-
taken openly; (4) the actor must be willing to submit to prosecu-
tion and punishment; (5) it must be aimed at making known the
righteousness of one's claims; and (6) it should not be employed
for coercive or intimidating reasons.49 Raz rejects most of these
limitations, as well as the claim that civil disobedience should only
be used as a measure of last resort.5" He believes that in certain
situations, civil disobedience is even preferable to effective lawful
action.5" He also expressly rejects the claim that civil disobedience
must be nonviolent. He argues that while nonviolent disobedience
is preferable to violent disobedience, the reasons often given 2 do
not justify excluding violence as a means of achieving political ends
in all situations; where an evil is great and possibly involves vio-
lence against innocent persons, violent disobedience may be war-
ranted to combat it.
5 3
A major thesis propounded by Raz is that all states ought to be
what he terms "liberal states," and in a liberal state, citizens have
no moral right to civil disobedience. On the other hand, in "illib-
eral states," citizens normally have such a right.5 4 A liberal state is
one in which the "liberal principle" is "adequately recognized and
protected in law"; conversely, an illiberal state is one in which this
principle is not so recognized and protected.55 The liberal princi-
ple is the right of every person to political participation in his or
her society.5 6 The law, however, should set limits on the liberal
48. RAZ, supra note 4, at 269.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 269; see also supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
51. RAz, supra note 4, at 269. As an example, Raz poses the question: "Which is
worse: a miners' march in London which perpetrates various offenses such as obstruction
to the highway, or a lawful lengthy miners' strike?" Id.
52. Raz lists three such reasons: first, violence causes direct harm; second, even in
situations where the use of violence might otherwise be justified, its use might encourage
others to resort to violence in situations where the use of violence is not justified; third,
"the use of violence is a highly emotional and explosive issue ... and in turning to
violence one is likely to antagonize potential allies and confirm in their opposition many
of one's opponents." Id. at 267.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 272.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 271. Raz says that "[t]he right [to political participation] means nothing if
[Vol. 24
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principle. These limits should be arrived at through the political
process and should not seriously infringe on the people's right to
participate. 57 With this as background, Raz asserts that members
of an illiberal state have a right to civil disobedience, which
roughly acts as a substitute for their unrecognized right to political
participation."8 In the liberal state, however, where one's right to
political participation is recognized, a right to civil disobedience
does not exist.59
Even though no right to engage in civil disobedience exists in a
liberal state, civil disobedience in protest against bad laws or
against bad public policies may sometimes be justified. 6° In a lib-
eral state, however, civil disobedience is "an exceptional political
action."' 6' For Raz, the strength of civil disobedience as a means of
protest in a liberal state derives from its exceptional character as a
type of political action to which a citizen of such a state has no
right.62 Therefore, Raz rejects the claim that civil disobedience is
justified only as a last resort. First, "it may be less harmful than
certain kinds of lawful action (for example, a national strike, or a
long strike in a key industry or service). ' 63 In addition, relying on
civil disobedience only as a last resort "make[s] it a regular form of
political action to which all have a right."'64
it does not mean the right of every member of a society to try to get his society to en-
dorse, at least to some degree, political objectives which he supports, be they what they
may." Id. at 271-72.
57. RAz, supra note 4, at 272. According to Raz, the liberal principle must be lim-
ited "because of the need to respect the same right in others and because the right to
political participation is neither the only nor an absolute value and it has to be limited in
order to safeguard other values." Id. at 271.
58. Id. at 272.
59. Id. at 272-73.
60. Id. at 273. In deciding whether to engage in civil disobedience in a liberal state,
the absence of a "right" to such action does, nevertheless, affect the actor's decision in
two ways:
First, he may be less than certain that his action is justified and therefore, cau-
tion may advise desisting from an action to which one may not be entitled.
Secondly, civil disobedience is a very divisive action. It is all the more so be-
cause of the absence of a right to it (in liberal states). In taking a civilly disobe-
dient action, one steps outside the legitimate bounds of toleration and this in






64. Id. (emphasis added). Raz goes on to argue that the "exceptional character [of
civil disobedience] lies precisely in the reverse of this claim, in the fact that it is (in liberal
states) one type of political action to which one has no right." Id.
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In summary, Raz rejects a general moral obligation to obey the
law, even in a good society. In an illiberal state, citizens have a
general right to engage in civil disobedience to the extent that their
right to political participation is not recognized by the state, but in
a liberal state, citizens have no general right to engage in civil diso-
bedience. This rule does not mean that civilly disobedient acts are
never morally justifiable in a liberal state; in fact, such acts may be
justified as protests against bad laws or policies, to which even the
liberal state is prone. Civilly disobedient actors need not necessar-
ily be willing to submit to punishment or make their identities pub-
licly known; by definition, though, the occurrence of an act of civil
disobedience and the motivation behind it must be made known to
the public. Moreover, while civil disobedience need not be only a
measure of last resort, in a liberal state its strength as a means of
protest lies "precisely" in its "exceptional" nature.
C. Kent Greenawalt
Two decades ago, in A Contextual Approach to Disobedience,65
Kent Greenawalt defined civil disobedience as follows: "an illegal
act... committed to change a law or policy, and better society; the
act must be nonviolent and public; and the actor must intend to
accept punishment.
66
Greenawalt begins his essay by questioning whether individuals
have a moral duty to obey the law which overrides their moral
right to engage in civil disobedience .6  For Greenawalt, the answer
depends, first, on what the probable effects of the disobedience will
be and second, on whether those probable effects will be desira-
ble.68 Ultimately, an act of civil disobedience, "an act with social
consequences," is "morally justified if it will probably contribute to
the social good."
'69
Greenawalt goes on to define at length each component of this
assertion. An act is "morally justified" if it is "done by someone
who is well-intentioned and well-informed, and [who] can judge
65. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 48.
66. Id. at 60. One notices that under this definition, there is no requirement that the
act of disobedience be aimed directly at the law that the actor seeks to change. Under
Greenawalt's definition, Thoreau's disobedient act, his refusal to pay the poll tax, would
qualify as civil disobedience even though Thoreau did not seek to change or overturn the
poll tax law but rather to protest governmental policy on slavery and the Mexican-Amer-
ican War. The issue of whether the disobedience must be aimed directly at the objection-
able law or policy will be further discussed at various points throughout this essay.
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id. at 48-49.
69. Id. at 50-51.
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objectively."70 "Social good" is "synonymous with 'desirable so-
cial consequences.' ,,71 "Contributions" to the social good include
not only acts that will affirmatively add to the social good but also
acts that will "minimize impairment of the social good."'7 2 Some-
thing that will "probably" contribute to this good is something so
judged by "a reflective, intelligent, and well-informed" actor, ide-
ally on the basis of all facts and arguments available before he or
she acts."
Essentially, Greenawalt concludes that the occasions for using
civil disobedience as an impetus for social change in the United
States are rare.74 In assessing the appropriateness of civil disobedi-
ence, he stresses that the use of nonviolence and the willingness to
submit to punishment are crucial.75 Finally, Greenawalt urges that
those moved to civil disobedience proceed with great restraint and
consideration. 6
Along the way to this conclusion, Greenawalt examines and re-
jects "some possible alternatives and qualifications" concerning the
use of civil disobedience.7 7 First, he examines and rejects the social
contracts notion that "citizens have an overriding moral obligation
to obey the law, because they have consented to be bound by it."
7 8
The basis for his rejection is simply that the citizen's relationship
with the state is not one of contractual agreement. Though the
citizen may accept some of the benefits of society, the acceptance in
no way constitutes a promise or an obligation to perform in con-
formity with all of society's laws. 9 Second, he examines the notion
that citizens ought to obey the law because it would be impossible
to predict the social consequences of disobedience and because an
individual's judgment concerning disobedience is unreliable when
compared with the government's justification for certain laws. 80
70. Id. at 50.
71. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 51.
72. Id. at 53.
73. Id. at 53-54.
74. Id. at 76. Greenawalt goes on to say that he would "refrain from trying to lay
down absolute rules," admitting that his "own views are based on arguable assumptions
about complex social facts." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 54.
78. Id.
79. Id. Assuming, however, that one were to accept the social contracts rationale,
Greenawalt suggests that his test for judging the moral justification of civil disobedience
could be modified as follows: will the act probably "'make a contribution to the social
good large enough to outweigh the independent moral duty to obey' the law"? Id.
80. Id. at 57.
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Greenawalt concludes that while "the fallibility of individual
human judgment is highly relevant in determining the proper occa-
sions for disobedience," this fact should not preclude the use of
disobedience on every occasion.8'
Greenawalt also engages in "four broad inquiries" regarding the
"major kinds of distinctions drawn among illegal acts by those who
discuss disobedience. "82 These inquiries are as follows: (1) the
damage that might result to the interests of others from the disobe-
dient act, (2) the reason for the disobedience, (3) the actor's will-
ingness to accept punishment, and (4) the form of government
under which the disobedience takes place.
8 3
For Greenawalt, the first inquiry, the kind and degree of injury
done to others, is an important factor in determining whether the
disobedience is justified. 4 Greenawalt concludes that any disobe-
dient act that significantly interferes with another's interest can
only be justified if it is supported by compelling reasons.
8 5
Whatever the reason for disobedience, the disobedient act need
not be directed exclusively at the law or policy that the actor seeks
to change.8 6 First, it is often difficult to determine the exact law or
policy that the disobedient person seeks to protest; thus, the appli-
cation of any rule permitting nonviolent disobedience which is di-
rected only at the challenged law or policy might be "elusive."8
More importantly, often the violation of another law may result in
less harm than would the violation of the law that is the true target
of the disobedience.8 8 At most, says Greenawalt, one might need
stronger grounds to justify a disobedient act that is not directed at
the unjust law or policy than one would need to justify a disobedi-
ent act directed at the law or policy itself.8 9
81. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 58.
82. Id. at 61.
83. Id. at 61-75.
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id. at 67.
87. Id. For example, "[i]f someone who violates the draft law thinks the Vietnam
war is immoral but accepts the need for a peacetime draft, is the draft law the focus or
target of the protest?" Id.
88. Id. at 67-68. For example, "[i]f Negroes 'sit-in' at a voluntarily segregated restau-
rant, do they violate the general trespass law (to which they do not object) or the exist-
ence of legal principles that allow segregation?" Id. at 67.
89. Id. at 68. The notion that the disobedient act must actually violate the challenged
law or policy is somewhat problematic when the challenge is to a public policy as op-
posed to a law. Assuming, arguendo, that in the process of committing a civilly disobedi-
ent act a person were morally required to violate only the law to which he or she
objected, it is difficult to translate such a requirement into the situation in which a gov-
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Greenawalt also asserts that a morally justifiable act of civil dis-
obedience does not necessarily require that the actor be willing to
accept punishment.9 Nevertheless, Greenawalt cites four very
persuasive reasons why a disobedient's willingness to accept pun-
ishment may contribute to a moral justification for his or her act.
First, such a willingness may reduce the level of frustration, resent-
ment, and insecurity felt by those whose interests have been injured
by the act. Second, such a willingness serves to test the strength of
the actor's convictions. Third, this willingness demonstrates to
others the depth of the actor's convictions. Finally, the willingness
reaffirms the fact that the actor is a member of the community, and
it may make massive repression (which may cause great harm and
undo the social good of the act) less likely.9'
With respect to the fourth inquiry, the form of government
under which the disobedience takes place, Greenawalt rejects the
suggestion that civil disobedience is never justified in a democ-
racy.92 He admits, however, that in a democracy few occasions
may exist for morally justified civil disobedience because, where
leaders are publicly elected and public policies are affected by open
discussion and debate, it is more probable that laws will be in the
public's interest.93 Thus, in a democratic state, it may be more
difficult, though by no means impossible, to justify individual acts
of civil disobedience.
Greenawalt also raises the issue of when it might be morally jus-
ernment policy is being challenged. After all, how does a private citizen go about directly
violating a policy as opposed to a law?
90. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 70. For example, an individual help-
ing Jews to escape from Nazi Germany could not have accepted punishment. For such
an individual to have given himself or herself up would have made it impossible for such
aid to continue; thus, it would have been "perfectly moral" for this individual to try to
avoid punishment. Id. An example such as this one provides a strong counterargument
to claims that the disobedient must always be willing to accept punishment for his or her
acts in order for such acts to be morally justified.
91. Id. at 70-71.
92. Id. at 72. Greenawalt once again resorts to the example of Nazi Germany. If
Hitler had been popularly elected in 1941 as the absolute ruler of Germany for a four-
year term, or if a majority of Germans had approved the policy of genocide, there would
still have been great need for civil disobedience; indeed, in Greenawalt's opinion, there
would have been justification for violent action. A democratic majority may also simply
be unjust: "Given the sad history of mankind .... I lack confidence that a democratic
majority would never approve policies wicked enough to justify violent disobedience."
Id.
93. Id. Compare the discussion of Raz's viewpoint on the justification of civil disobe-
dience in a liberal state, supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text; Rawls's thoughts on
this issue, infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text; and Dworkin's views on this point,
infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
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tifiable to disobey a statute that a citizen believes to be unconstitu-
tional. 94 For Greenawalt, the more likely it is that a court will
strike down the challenged law as unconstitutional, the more likely
it is that the disobedient, in violating that law, will contribute to
the social good and, hence, the more morally justifiable the act
would be according to this particular criterion.9 5 Moreover,
Greenawalt makes it clear that he does not believe that efforts to
change the challenged law through the legislative process must
have first been unsuccessfully attempted before a person resorts to
morally justifiable civil disobedience.96
By the time Conflicts of Law and Morality97 appeared in 1987,
Greenawalt had refined and revised some of the assertions made in
his earlier essay. In Conflicts, Greenawalt is more interested in
working out a broader and more general theory of when one
should follow the dictates of one's conscience rather than whether
there exists any general duty to obey the law.98 He also reexamines
a number of issues raised in his earlier essay that bear on the moral
justifiability of civilly disobedient acts.
First, he reexamines the justification for disobedience in in-
stances in which one believes that a law is unconstitutional.99 He
considers three situations. In the first, the actor is reasonably cer-
tain that the claim of unconstitutionality will be upheld. 100 In this
situation, not only does one have no obligation to obey the law, but
one has an affirmative obligation to disobey it and bring it under
94. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 77.
95. Id.
96. Id. According to Greenawalt, such efforts "are usually drawn out and uncertain
of success, and repeal does not have the same effect on the law's development as the
establishment of a constitutional principle." Id
97. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4.
98. In this regard, he states:
Morally acceptable reasons for disobedience include overriding obligations to
others, conscientious objection to performing required acts, belief that disobedi-
ence will promote justice or welfare, and, occasionally, strong personal motiva-
tions. Arrayed against these sorts of reasons are nonconsequential duties and
consequential reasons in favor of obeying laws and whatever independent moral
reasons support doing the acts the law requires.
Id. at 226-27. Greenawalt devotes much of his book to the issue of whether there exists a
general duty to obey the law. After reviewing a number of grounds that may create
duties to obey the law, Greenawalt concludes that there is no "single ground of duty to
obey all laws, or all just laws, on every occasion of their application," although there are
"multiple grounds for obedience in various circumstances." Id. at 207. See generally id.
chs. 1-8.
99. Id. at 227. Compare the thoughts of Dworkin, infra notes 181-90 and accompa-
nying text. See also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
100. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 227.
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judicial review. 101 In the second situation, disobedience to a chal-
lenged law is justified where the actor believes that the constitu-
tionality of the law is doubtful, but understands that a legal
challenge will probably fail. 10 2 The rationale here is that serious,
though probably losing, challenges are a "healthy part of the legal
order."' 1 3 In the third situation, however, the actor knows that the
law is constitutional and will be upheld, but has a firm personal
feeling about the law."° In this case, that strong personal feeling
does not, in and of itself, justify the disobedient act."0 5
Greenawalt appears to have changed his ideas on whether an
effort to change the challenged law or policy through the political
process is a prerequisite to justifiable disobedience. In his essay,
Greenawalt expressed his belief that such efforts, while carrying
some weight in the determination of the moral justification of a
disobedient act, are not absolutely prerequisite to morally justifi-
able civil disobedience. 1° 6 Greenawalt now believes that under
most circumstances, a person should pursue lawful political reme-
dies before turning to disobedience. 1 7
Greenawalt revisits his "four broad inquiries" 108 and reexamines
the relationship between the effect of civil disobedience on the in-
terests of others and the moral justification for such action."° Ac-
cording to Greenawalt, violations of law may affect third parties'
interests in one or more of three ways: illegal acts may (1) cause
inconvenience to others, (2) interfere with the property rights of
others, or (3) cause physical harm to others. 10 The more serious
101. Id. "Any reasonable view of an individual's duties in a political order providing
judicial review must include the appropriateness of testing the validity of laws that appear
invalid. No otherwise applicable deontological principle would require obedience when
disobedience is the only avenue for testing validity." Id. Greenawalt continues that such
a challenge serves the utilitarian objective of eliminating improper legal norms; moreover,
"the existence of the legal claim will also affect perceptions of a violation, making it
appear as something other than a challenge to the legal order." Id. at 227-28.
102. Id. at 228.
103. Id. Furthermore, such challenges sometimes do succeed. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Dworkin appears to differ from Greenawalt as to this third situation. See
infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
106. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 72. See also supra note 96 and ac-
companying text.
107. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 229. Greenawalt still rejects the
need for "patently futile" pursuit of lawful alternatives. Id. He notes, however, that even
if one is ultimately justified in disobedience, "one at least owes it to one's fellow [sic] to
try to avoid that impasse by persuading them to change their minds." Id.
108. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
109. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 236.
110. Id. at 237.
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the impact of the illegal acts is on the interests of others, the
greater the moral reasons are to refrain from engaging in the illegal
acts."' Moreover, the less probable it is that any good would be
achieved as a result of the illegal acts, the greater that good would
have to be to outweigh potential harm to third parties."
2
Greenawalt rejects the notion that civil disobedience is never jus-
tified when the law being violated is not itself the target of pro-
test." I 3 He admits that disobedience is more easily justified when a
close nexus exists between the injustice being protested and the law
being disobeyed." 4 However, he repeats his point that it is some-
times difficult to decide whether the disobedient acts are actually
aimed at the challenged law; the "perplexities" of applying any ab-
solutist standard in this regard "highlight the basic indefensibility
of a sharp distinction of this kind."
' 15
Once again, Greenawalt rejects the notions that acts of civil dis-
obedience must be open and that the actor must be willing to sub-
mit to punishment." 6 He notes that because "applications of some
laws are not reached by any obligation to obey," many violations of
such laws will not be open. Furthermore, the effectiveness of cer-
tain justifiable forms of civil disobedience may depend upon se-
crecy." 7 He notes, however, that the actor's willing acceptance of
punishment may have a number of salutary effects." 8
Finally, Greenawalt decides that nonviolent disobedience need
111. Id.
112. Id. at 238.
113. Id. at 235; see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
114. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 235. Greenawalt further states that
"[t]he force of the example of disobedience will be more contained and the interests that
are compromised by disobedience will be less likely to warrant protection" when a nexus
exists between the law being protested and the law being violated. Id.
115. Id. at 235-36. Greenawalt continues:
If justifiable protests were limited in the way.., suggested, some laws and
policies-for example, a highly unjust definition of treason or an egregious use
of military force abroad-might be entirely immune from law-violating protest,
as would be any injustice that results from a failure to enact laws to prevent
great wrongs.
Id. at 236. Rawls is in agreement on this point. See infra text accompanying notes 137-
39.
116. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
117. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 238-39. As an example of the latter
type of situation, Greenawalt asserts that "[r]elieving people from the bonds of slavery
justifies secretive violation of law"; he admits, though, that slavery is "an extreme exam-
ple." Id. at 239.
118. Id. at 238-40. These salutary effects include: the mitigation of the force of a
violation of a deontological duty; the reduction of the level of frustration, resentment, and
insecurity felt by those whose interests have been affected; the demonstration of the
strength of the actor's convictions, both to himself or herself and to others; and the ac-
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not be directed at the majority's sense of justice or be responsive to
substantial injustice in order to be justified. 19 Civil disobedience
may be justified as a protest against present or potential harms that
derive simply from erroneous judgments. 120 Greenawalt also ar-
gues that the appeal of civil disobedience to the majority's sense of
justice "may be important to measuring the magnitude of claims to
obey and disobey," but it does not mark "a critical dividing line
between justifiable civil disobedience and other disobedience.' 2'
For Greenawalt, then, an act of civil disobedience is morally jus-
tifiable if it will probably contribute to the social good. However, if
the act would interfere with the interests of others, the reasons for
the act must outweigh such interference. It is not necessary that
the disobedient act be directed at a law or policy that the actor
seeks to change. Furthermore, it is not necessary that it be com-
mitted openly or that the actor willingly submit to punishment.
Moreover, Greenawalt rejects the notion that civil disobedience is
never justified in a democratic state, but he has come to believe
that the actor should pursue lawful alternatives before resorting to
civilly disobedient acts.
D. John Rawls
John Rawls sets out his theory of civil disobedience in A Theory
of Justice. 12 2 He asserts that in a reasonably just society, the citizen
has a general duty to comply with even unjust laws. 23 However,
grossly unjust laws should not be obeyed. Gross injustice can arise
either in a nearly just society when laws and policies vary from
normative standards of justice, or in an unjust society when laws
knowledgment of a commitment to the fundamentals of the existing legal order. Id. at
239-40. Compare supra text accompanying note 91.
119. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 230.
120. Id. at 234.
121. Id. at 235. Greenawalt admits that a "sensible approach to disobedience must
calibrate the degree of injustice or likely harm to the magnitude of the disobedience.
Much less is needed to justify minor localized disobedience than major illegal demonstra-
tions." Id.
122. RAWLS, supra note 4.
123. Id. at 350-51. Rawls says:
The injustice of a law is not, in general, a sufficient reason for not adhering to it
any more than the legal validity of legislation (as defined by the existing consti-
tution) is a sufficient reason for going along with it. When the basic structure of
society is reasonably just ... we are to recognize unjust laws as binding pro-
vided that they do not exceed certain limits of injustice.
Id. Compare with Raz's opposite view that there is no general moral obligation to obey
the law even in a good society with a just legal system. See supra notes 36-40 and accom-
panying text.
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and policies conform to that society's own unjust norms. 124
In a nearly just society, one normally has the duty to comply
with even unjust laws. ,25 This duty arises by virtue of the duty to
support a just constitution.' 26 However, there are certain limits to
this duty. For example, there is no duty to comply with an unjust
law when the burden is not distributed equally but instead falls
inequitably on certain permanent minorities.127 Similarly, one has
no duty to comply with an unjust law that infringes on certain
basic liberties guaranteed to the people.
128
Rawls submits that some form of majority rule is the best way to
ensure that just legislation and policies will be enacted and fol-
lowed in society.' 29 Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that every
law enacted by the majority will be just.130 In fact, Rawls acknowl-
edges the impossibility of characterizing an ideal legislative process
that would always enact just laws.' 3' He posits that just laws and
policies are those enacted by rational legislators following the prin-
ciples of justice and acting under the authority and constraints of a
just constitution. 32 However, while it is possible (and even prob-
able) that an unjust law or policy will be enacted in a society that is
nearly just, and while a citizen may normally be duty-bound to
comply with it, the citizen need not believe that the law is just.1 3 3
124. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 352.
125. See id. at 353.
126. Id. at 354.
127. Id. at 355. Rawls further states:
[I]n the long run the burden of injustice should be more or less evenly distrib-
uted over different groups in society, and the hardship of unjust policies should
not weigh too heavily in any particular case .... [W]e submit our conduct to
democratic authority only to the extent necessary to share equitably in the inev-
itable imperfections of a constitutional system. Accepting these hardships is
simply recognizing and being willing to work within the limits imposed by the
circumstances of human life.
Id.
128. Id.
129. RAwLs, supra note 4, at 356.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 360.
132. Id. at 357.
133. Id. at 360. Rawls notes: "[I]f the law actually voted is, so far as one can ascer-
tain, within the range of those that could reasonably be favored by rational legislators
conscientiously trying to follow the principles of justice, then the decision of the majority
is practically authoritative, though not definitive." Id. at 362.
Yet even in a "reasonably just society" a citizen may refuse to comply with "unjust
laws" that "exceed certain limits of injustice." Id. at 351. For Rawls, "the principles of
right ... may justify noncompliance in certain situations, all things considered." Id. at
352. Justification for noncompliance "depends on the extent to which laws and institu-
tions are unjust." Id. See also supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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With the above as background, Rawls proceeds to define civil
disobedience as "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political
act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a
change in the law or policies of the government."' 34 Rawls's the-
ory of civil disobedience is designed only for nearly just societies,
ones that are generally well-ordered but where injustices neverthe-
less do occur.135 Rawls admits that it is difficult to determine ex-
actly when, in a nearly just society, one has a right to engage in
civil disobedience.
36
Rawls discusses a number of what he calls "glosses" on his defi-
nition of civil disobedience. First, the civilly disobedient actor
134. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 364. By his own admission, Rawls's definition of civil
disobedience does not include the concept of "conscientious refusal," which Rawls de-
fines as the "noncompliance with a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative
order." Id. at 368. For him, conscientious refusal, unlike civil disobedience, "is not a
form of address appealing to the sense of justice of the majority." Id. at 369. Nor is
conscientious refusal "necessarily based on political principles; it may be founded on reli-
gious or other principles at variance with the constitutional order. Civil disobedience is
an appeal to a commonly shared conception of justice, whereas conscientious refusal may
have other grounds." Id.
Rawls admits that "it is customary to think of civil disobedience in a broader sense as
any noncompliance with law for conscientious reasons, at least when it is not covert and
does not involve the use of force." Id. at 368. He notes that Thoreau's conception of civil
disobedience, which includes what Rawls has termed "conscientious refusal," is "charac-
teristic, if not definitive, of the traditional meaning" of civil disobedience. Id.
Rawls's definition of civil disobedience also excludes violence. For Rawls, "[c]ivil diso-
bedience ... is clearly distinct from militant action and obstruction; it is far removed
from organized forcible resistance." Id. at 367. Civil disobedience, then,
falls between legal protest and the raising of test cases [which he distinguishes
from civil disobedience] on the one side, and conscientious refusal and the vari-
ous forms of resistance on the other. In this range of possibilities it stands for
that form of dissent at the boundary of fidelity to law.
Id.
Rawls does not conclude, however, that violent disobedience is never justified. See id.
at 366; see also infra note 145.
135. RAWLs, supra note 4, at 363. A state of near-justice requires, in his estimation,
a democratic regime, and Rawls asks, "[a]t what point does the duty to comply with laws
enacted by a legislative majority (or with executive acts supported by such a majority)
cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one's liberties and the duty to oppose
injustice?" Id.
Because, by hypothesis, Rawls's theory of disobedience applies only to democratic,
nearly-just regimes, there is never a question of whether civil disobedience is justified in a
corrupt or unjust regime. If any means are justified in attempts to transform or overturn
such a regime, then certainly nonviolent opposition would be justified. Id.
136. Rawls notes:
Precise principles that straightway decide actual cases are clearly out of the
question. Instead, a useful theory defines a perspective within which the prob-
lem of civil disobedience can be approached; it identifies the relevant considera-
tions and helps us to assign them their correct weights in the more important
instances.
Id. at 364.
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need not breach the very law being protested. 37 It would be im-
possible, or at least impracticable, to breach a law to protest a gov-
ernment's foreign policy or to protest a harsh and vague statute
against treason. 3 Moreover, in some situations it may be wiser to
contravene a minor law (such as a traffic ordinance or a trespass
law) as a means of protesting a perceived unjust major law.'9 Sec-
ond, the actor must consider the civilly disobedient act to be in fact
contrary to law. 40 The act that merely raises a test case does not
fall within Rawls's definition of civil disobedience. ' Third, in
seeking a moral justification for acts of civil disobedience, the actor
is appealing not to principles of personal morality or religion (let
alone self-interest), but rather to "the commonly shared concep-
tion of justice that underlies the political order."'' 4 2 Finally, civil
disobedience must be a public and nonviolent act.'43 To engage in
violent acts likely to injure others is to obscure the righteous
message sought to be communicated.'" Rawls admits, however,
that at times forceful resistance may be considered, but only after
peaceful appeals have failed. 
4 -
Having defined civil disobedience, Rawls discusses when acts of
civil disobedience may be morally justified. He believes that civilly
disobedient acts are justified only if the actor has targeted his or
her acts to "instances of substantial and clear injustice"'" and has
137. Id.
138. Id. at 365.
139. Id. On this point, Rawls is squarely in agreement with Greenawalt. See supra
notes 86-89, 113-15 and accompanying text.
140. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 365.
141. Id. Dworkin would disagree, since he includes acts that raise test cases within
his conception of civil disobedience. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
Greenawalt is in line with Dworkin on this point. See supra notes 94-96 and accompany-
ing text.
142. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 365. In this instance, Rawls particularly differs from
Greenawalt. See supra notes 119-21.
143. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 366.
144. Id. He explains that "any interference with the civil liberties of others tends to
obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one's act." Id.
145. Id. Another reason for his requirement that civil disobedience be nonviolent is
that it
expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at
the outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the
public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal
consequences of one's conduct.
Id. On these points, Rawls would find himself at odds with Dworkin on the issue of
fidelity to law (see infra notes 160-77 and accompanying text) and with Greenawalt on
the issue of willingness to accept the legal consequences of the act (see supra notes 90-91,
116, and accompanying text).
146. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 371-72. As a qualifier, Rawls adds that these acts
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unsuccessfully made a good-faith effort to redress the injustice
through legal means. 47 Additionally, Rawls asserts that civil diso-
bedience may fail when a number of groups engage in justifiable
civil disobedience at the same time. In such a situation, serious
disorder and a breakdown in respect for the law would result or the
general public would cease to understand and handle the dissent. 148
Finally, Rawls lists two more conditions that may limit civilly dis-
obedient acts. First, consideration should be given to the possibil-
ity of injury to third parties; 49 second, even if the conduct would
otherwise be justified, wisdom or prudence might advise against
resorting to civilly disobedient acts.5 °
The role of civil disobedience in a nearly just society is an impor-
tant one. According to Rawls, civil disobedience can be a stabiliz-
ing factor in a constitutional state. Reasoned and thoughtful
resistance through civil disobedience can serve as a check on the
system and thus prevent serious departures from justice.III When
a person engages in civil disobedience, he or she is appealing to the
majority's sense of justice and is serving notice that he or she be-
should, preferably, be directed at those substantial and clear injustices that "obstruct the
path to removing other injustices." Id. at 372.
147. Id. at 373. These appeals need not, however, have been exhausted, nor need
they have been engaged in if they would clearly have been fruitless or if there had been
certain "extreme" cases of injustice. Id. These qualifications serve to bring Rawls's views
somewhat closer to those of Greenawalt on the requirement of appeal to the majority.
See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
148. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 373-74. Greenawalt expresses skepticism about this
third principle. See GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 233. This third princi-
ple will be referred to hereinafter as the "overload principle."
Of course, one might argue that if there were so many groups that were justified in
engaging in civil disobedience but for conditions coinciding with this "overload princi-
ple," such a situation could be evidence that the society was not nearly so just as might
originally have been believed.
Admittedly, one might conceive of a nearly-just society enacting legislation that is
grossly unjust to a large number of groups so that each group would have the right to
engage in civil disobedience without also imagining that such legislation in and of itself
rendered the otherwise nearly-just society unjust.
Moreover, Rawls's call for coordination and cooperation among the groups entitled to
engage in civil disobedience, so as to bring the level of dissent within that which would be
tolerable under the "overload principle," seems overly optimistic. Rawls admits that,
while he does not believe this task to be impossible, such cooperation and coordination
would be difficult. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 374-75.
149. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 375. Rawls does not say how much allowance should
be made for the possibility of third party injury or exactly how this factor should weigh in
the balance of justification. He admits that his theory does not deal with such "practical
considerations." See id. at 376.
150. Id. at 376. With respect to the wisdom or prudence of engaging in civil disobe-
dience, Rawls explains that "[wie may be acting within our rights but nevertheless un-
wisely if our conduct only serves to provoke the harsh retaliation of the majority." Id.
151. Id. at 383.
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lieves that "the conditions of free cooperation are being
violated.
152
Civil disobedience is effective only in a nearly just society, for in
an unjust society, where there is no sense of justice to appeal to, the
majority may simply be compelled to crush any dissenting
voices.153 In a nearly just society, though, ruthless tactics aimed at
quelling protesters would not be politically viable. 154 Thus, in a
nearly just society, the majority may even abandon its position and
adopt the proposals of the dissenters as it realizes the indefen-
sibility of its unjust advantages.155 This is how Rawls believes civil
disobedience ought to function in a nearly just society.156 Even in a
nearly just society, however, the danger that civil disobedience will
grow into widespread civic turmoil and divisive strife is ever-pres-
ent. Yet, Rawls notes that ultimately, the responsibility for such
division rests not on the protestors, but on those in authority who
have maintained unjust institutions.
157
In summary, Rawls maintains that in a nearly just society, a
general duty to comply, even with unjust laws, exists. In such a
152. Id. at 382-83. "we are appealing to others to reconsider, to put themselves in
our position, and to recognize that they cannot expect us to acquiesce indefinitely in the
terms they impose upon us." Id. at 383. "If after a decent period of time to allow for
reasonable political appeals in the normal way, citizens were to dissent by civil disobedi-
ence when infractions of the basic liberties occurred, these liberties would, it seems, be
more rather than less secure." Id. at 384.
153. Id. at 386-87.
154. RAwLs, supra note 4, at 387.
155. Id.
156. Rawls admits that his theory of civil disobedience is risky, for it fails to delineate
exactly what circumstances would justify disobedient action. It might, he says, be argued
that his theory
invites anarchy by encouraging everyone to decide for himself [when resort to
civil disobedience is justified], and to abandon the public rendering of political
principles. The reply to this is that each person must indeed make his own
decision.... The citizen is autonomous yet he is held responsible for what he
does. If we ordinarily think that we should comply with the law, this is because
our political principles normally lead to this conclusion....
But while each person must decide for himself whether circumstances justify
civil disobedience, it does not follow that one is to decide as one pleases. It is
not by looking to our personal interests, or to our political allegiances narrowly
construed, that we should make up our minds. To act autonomously and
responsibly a citizen must look to the political principles that underlie and
guide the interpretation of the constitution. He must try to assess how these
principles should be applied in the existing circumstances. If he comes to the
conclusion after due consideration that civil disobedience is justified and con-
ducts himself accordingly, he acts conscientiously. And though he may be mis-
taken, he has not done as he pleased.
Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 390-91.
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society, civil disobedience is a public, nonviolent, illegal act aimed
at changing a law or government policy. While the disobedient act
need not breach the law objected to, the actor must understand
that his or her act is in fact contrary to law (that is, for Rawls, the
purpose of the disobedient act must be more than the mere raising
of a test case), and he or she must commit the act openly and be
willing to accept resultant punishment. Furthermore, any civilly
disobedient act must appeal to the majority's sense of justice and,
as a general rule, may be resorted to only after appeals to the ma-
jority have met, or are deemed likely to meet, with failure. Finally,
in Rawls's estimation, the possibility of injury to third parties and
the dictates of prudence may make acts of civil disobedience
improper.
E. Ronald Dworkin
Ronald Dworkin sets forth his views on civil disobedience in
Taking Rights Seriously,' where he concludes that a citizen does
have a "moral right to break a law."' 5 9
Under what circumstances is a person justified in breaking the
law? Dworkin begins his search for the answer by examining the
views of those whom he respectively calls "conservatives" and "lib-
erals.'' 6" Liberals view acts of civil disobedience more sympatheti-
cally than do conservatives, who, according to Dworkin, generally
do not approve of any act of disobedience. 161 Yet, both sides would
agree that in a democracy citizens have a general moral duty to
obey all laws, even if they believe that some laws are wrong and
ought to be changed. 62 This general moral duty, which citizens
owe to one another is not, however, an absolute duty because even
just societies may produce unjust laws that would conflict with a
citizen's personal or religious philosophy. 63 In such instances, a
citizen is entitled to do what he or she thinks is right; however, if
his or her actions entail the transgression of a law, then he or she
must submit to the punishment the state imposes. This is "in rec-
ognition of the fact that his duty to his fellow citizens was over-
158. DWORKIN, supra note 4.
159. Id. at 186.
160. Id. Dworkin ignores the beliefs of the two small minorities on either extreme,
one of which would say that a person never has a moral duty to obey the law, and the
other of which would say that a person never has a moral right to disobey the law. Id. at
186-87.
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whelmed but not extinguished by his religious or moral
obligation."'"M This position, which Dworkin argues is espoused
by both liberals and conservatives, closely comports with Rawls'
views on the moral duty to obey the law. 65
For Dworkin, the majority position, held by liberals and con-
servatives alike, raises a "monstrous contradiction": if "a man has
a right to do what his conscience tells him he must, then how can
the State be justified in discouraging him from doing it" via the
medium of punishment? 66 The irony of this contradiction is
heightened by the fact that liberals and conservatives, both having
decided that a citizen must follow the dictates of his or her con-
science, so often disagree over when the citizen's decision to diso-
bey has moral validity.
67
Dworkin believes that the explanation for this contradiction can
be found in the two different ways that the word right is used.
6
1
First, the word right may be used in what Dworkin terms its
"strong" sense. In this case, if a person has a right, then it is
wrong to interfere with the exercise of that right. 69 On the other
hand, if one has a right in its "weaker" sense, one is not wrong to
exercise it, but neither is it wrong for another to interfere with the
action. 1
70
For Dworkin, then, the question of whether one ever has the
right to break the law is inherently ambiguous. '7' Does the answer
to the question mean that one never has a right in the strong sense
to break a law for which the government could prosecute him, or
does it mean that one may be right in the weaker sense in breaking
the law even though the government would prosecute him?
172
When the word right is used in this weaker sense, liberals and con-
servatives run into disagreement. Both agree that sometimes a citi-
zen does no wrong by breaking the law when his or her conscience
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
166. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 187.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 188.
169. Id. As an example of this use of the word right, Dworkin notes that one has a
right to spend one's money gambling. Thus it would be wrong if Dworkin or the state
interfered with the gambler's right to gamble even though it might be "wrong" to gamble,
in the sense that one ought to spend one's money in more worthwhile endeavors. Id.
170. Id. at 188-89. As an example of this sense of the word right, Dworkin talks of a
captured soldier who has a right to attempt escape. The soldier does no wrong in trying
to escape, but his or her captors do no wrong in trying to interfere with the captive's
escape. Id. at 189.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 189-90.
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so requires, but they differ over exactly when it is appropriate for
the government to prosecute such a citizen. 173
Dworkin reframes the issue and asks whether a citizen has a
right to break the law "in the strong sense," the sense in which it
would be wrong for the state to interfere with his or her actions. 1
74
In answering this question, he determines that there are certain
fundamental rights, in the strong sense, and that it would be wrong
for the state to abridge these rights even if the state determined
that the majority would be thereby better served. 175  If the state
were to abridge these fundamental rights, a citizen would have the
right, in the strong sense, to refuse to obey the laws abridging such
rights, and the state would do further wrong in enforcing such
laws. 176 Following Dworkin's approach, the general duty to obey
the law, which is recognized by both liberals and conservatives,
would be inapplicable in a society that does not recognize funda-
mental rights. This is because a person would be completely justi-
fied in breaking a law that infringed on his or her basic liberties.1
77
Dworkin, thus, apparently denies the existence of any general duty
to obey the law even in a reasonably just society.
However, even Dworkin recognizes certain practical limitations
on acts of civil disobedience. If a citizen decides to engage in a
disobedient act on the basis of a belief that he or she has a right (in
the strong sense) to do so, he or she must still determine whether
engaging in such an act would be "the right thing to do" (in the
weaker sense).' 78 Thus, one must consider that others may reason-
ably differ in their opinions regarding one's right to break the
law. ' 79 Also, one should consider the consequences of breaking the
law: Would the act involve violence? Would it violate the rights of
others? Would the disobedient act also violate other laws that one
does not have a good-faith claim to break?
8 0
How ought one to behave when faced with a law that he or she
173. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 190. Presumably, "conservatives" will call for pros-
ecution of the civil disobedient more often than will "liberals."
174. Id. Dworkin cites, as an example of a fundamental right in this strong sense, the
right of free speech: the government would do wrong to attempt to repeal this right, even
if the majority could be persuaded to do so. Id. at 192.
175. Id. Dworkin admits that, under certain exceptional circumstances, "when some
compelling reason is presented," a government may abridge these fundamental rights.
See generally id. at 200-01.
176. Id. at 190-92.
177. Id. at 192-93. Dworkin's discussion of how one might go about determining
these fundamental rights is beyond the scope of this essay. See id. at 197-204.
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believes is unconstitutional?'' Dworkin examines three possible
models of citizen action in the face of such a law. One possibility is
that the citizen should simply obey the law, assuming that the law
does not permit what the citizen desires to do.'8 2 Dworkin rejects
this position, reasoning that if "no court has decided the issue...,
most of our lawyers and critics think it perfectly proper" for the
citizen to follow his or her own judgment in the matter.1 8 3 More-
over, if citizens did not defy the laws they sought to challenge,
society would lose an important means of testing the validity of
such laws. '
8 4
Another possibility is that if the citizen believes that the case for
the constitutional permissibility of the action is stronger than the
case against it, the citizen may follow his or her own judgment and
do what he or she desires.18 5 Under this second alternative, how-
ever, once a court has addressed the law at issue and has ruled that
the law is constitutional, then the citizen contemplating disobedi-
ence is morally bound to obey that law.' 8 6 Dworkin rejects this
alternative because it fails to consider the possibility that the court
will be overruled.8 7 In light of this possibility, if citizens followed
the course suggested by this second model of action, society would
(as in the first model) lose an important means of testing the law's
validity. 8
Dworkin suggests and accepts as a model of action a third alter-
native. If the law is doubtful, the citizen may follow his or her own
judgment about obeying the law even if a contrary decision has
been reached by the highest court. 8 9 Of course, the citizen should
consider the logic of any adverse judicial decision in order to deter-
mine whether his or her challenge to that decision through civil
disobedience is honest and reasonable.190
181. According to Dworkin, one could argue that if the law is invalid, the violator
commits no crime, but if the law is valid, the violator commits a crime and must be
punished. Id. at 207-08. Dworkin rejects this neat dichotomy. Id. at 210.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 212.
184. Id. Recall that Rawls' definition of civil disobedience excludes testing the valid-
ity-of challenged laws. See supra note 134, and text accompanying note 141.
185. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 210.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 213.
188. Id. at 213-14.
189. Id. at 211.
190. Id. Dworkin explains his conclusion by noting:
A citizen's allegiance is to the law, not to any particular person's view of what
the law is, and he does not behave unfairly so long as he proceeds on his own
considered and reasonable view of what the law requires .... [T]his is not the
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In arriving at a resolution of the issues raised by a citizen's diso-
bedience to a challenged law, Dworkin does not discount the role
of prudence in the citizen's decision-making process. Even though
the individual may conclude that he or she would be acting prop-
erly in refusing to follow the law, it might not be prudent to do so
because of attendant circumstances (e.g., the possibility of a jail
sentence, financial hardship, or public opprobrium).'91 With this
admission, Dworkin approaches the positions of Raz192 and
Rawls' 91 regarding the role of prudence in civil disobedience,
although Rawls' notion of "prudence" includes prudence both in
this personal sense and in the sense of what would be prudent from
the standpoint of society.' 94 Thus, Dworkin, too, evinces a some-
what pragmatic side in his approach to civil disobedience.
To summarize, in a democratic state like the United States, an
actor may have a right (in Dworkin's "strong" sense) to engage in
civilly disobedient acts that violate the law, if the state abridges
certain fundamental rights of the actor. In such instances, it would
be morally wrong for the state to seek to punish the disobedient.
Therefore, the actor need not be willing to submit to punishment.
Civil disobedience serves the purpose of testing challenged laws.
Moreover, no general duty to obey the law exists even in a reason-
ably just society. Nevertheless, Dworkin recognizes that the right
to engage in civil disobedience has certain practical limitations, in-
cluding the actor's own good faith, his or her personal prudence,
same as saying that an individual may disregard what the courts have said. The
doctrine of precedent lies near the core of our legal system, and no one can
make a reasonable effort to follow the law unless he grants the courts the gen-
eral power to alter it by their decisions. But if the issue is one touching funda-
mental personal or political rights, and it is arguable that the Supreme Court
has made a mistake, a man is within his social rights in refusing to accept that
decision as conclusive.
Id. at 214-15. Dworkin reaches the following conclusion in this matter:
When the law is uncertain, in the sense that a plausible case can be made on
both sides, then a citizen who follows his own judgment is not behaving un-
fairly.... For that reason, our government has a special responsibility to try to
protect him, and soften his predicament, whenever it can do so without great
damage to other policies. It does not follow that the government can guarantee
him immunity-it cannot adopt the rule that it will prosecute no one who acts
out of conscience, or convict no one who reasonably disagrees with the
courts.... If the state never prosecuted, then the courts could not act on the
experience and the arguments the dissent has generated.
Id. at 215.
191. Id. at 213.
192. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
194. See id.
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considerations of the rights of others, and ramifications of the use
of violence.
III. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN CONTEXT: FIVE CONTEMPORARY
ILLUSTRATIONS
This section presents five related illustrations of situations in
which resort to civil disobedience might arguably be morally justi-
fiable. These illustrations will illuminate the theories of the five
philosophers that have been discussed. This section begins with a
basic fact pattern applicable to each illustration unless noted to the
contrary. 95 Admittedly, even five illustrations cannot capture all
of the nuances of the various theories of civil disobedience dis-
cussed in this essay. They should, however, serve to clarify some
of the major points of agreement and disagreement among the five
philosophers.
A. Basic Fact Pattern
An animal rights group called Save The Beasts (STB) opposes
the use of live animals in testing for medical, cosmetic, and other
similar purposes. The members of the group believe that such use
violates important rights of animals.196 STB decides to protest the
use of live animals for medical testing by the Center for Disease
Control (CDC), which is operated by the United States govern-
ment. Before engaging in this protest, STB unsuccessfully sought
to have CDC cease its use of live animals in medical testing; STB
conducted an extensive letter-writing campaign to the United
States Department of Health and Human Services and to members
of Congress, and appealed directly to the CDC itself.
B. First Illustration
To effectuate their protest, STB members, carrying signs pro-
testing the use of animals for medical testing, illegally block all
entrances to the CDC's facility for one hour at lunchtime one busi-
ness day. As a result, few people who desire to enter or exit the
facilities are able to do so during this time; however, no one is sig-
nificantly harmed by this action. Do the actions of the STB mem-
bers constitute morally justifiable civil disobedience?
The STB actions are nonviolent and are aimed more or less di-
195. The facts used in the following illustrations are purely hypothetical.
196. The animals are obviously unable to raise for themselves the issue of their rights.
For the purposes of the five illustrations, it should be assumed that STB has the moral
standing to raise this issue on the animals' behalf.
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rectly at the CDC, the party carrying out the government policy to
which STB objects. Moreover, STB has first made reasonable, al-
beit unsuccessful, efforts to change the objectionable policy. The
group's protest is public and open, and there is no indication that
the members are unwilling to accept appropriate punishment as a
result of their actions.
In this instance, it is difficult to see how the acts engaged in by
STB would not qualify as morally justifiable civil disobedience
under any of the theories of civil disobedience put forth by the five
writers discussed in this essay. This first illustration presents a rel-
atively easy case.
C. Second Illustration
The facts in this second illustration are the same as those in the
basic fact pattern and the first illustration, except that prior to
blocking all CDC entrances in protest, STB members made no ef-
forts of any kind to appeal for a change in the CDC's policy of
using animals for medical testing purposes.
The new variable is the fact that STB did not first make a legal
attempt to secure a change in the challenged policy, before resort-
ing to civilly disobedient protest. This fact raises the issue of
whether the actor must make a reasonable attempt to change the
challenged law or policy through political appeals as a precondi-
tion to his or her use of civil disobedience.
There would probably be no consensus among the five philoso-
phers on the moral justifiability of STB's actions under the facts of
this second illustration. Neither Thoreau nor Dworkin directly ad-
dresses this issue. One can infer from the actions and writings of
Thoreau'97 and from the general tenor of the writings of Dwor-
kin, 9 ' that neither man would condition the moral legitimacy of
civil disobedience on reasonable attempts to change the challenged
law or policy. Raz believes that such an attempt is not a prerequi-
site to morally legitimate civil disobedience.' 99
Two of the legal philosophers discussed in this essay, however,
would probably take a contrary view. Greenawalt believes that an
197. There is no indication that Thoreau made any attempts to change government
policy on slavery or the Mexican War before engaging in his act of civil disobedience.
One might respond, though, that any such attempts.would almost certainly have been
futile, thus absolving Thoreau from any duty to undertake them before committing any
civilly disobedient acts. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
198. Remember that Dworkin believes that citizens can test laws through disobedi-
ence. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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attempt to change the objectionable law or policy is a prerequisite
to the moral justification of civilly disobedient acts, unless such an
attempt would be "patently futile." 200 There is no indication in the
facts of this second illustration that STB reasonably believed that
any such attempt would be futile. Rawls agrees that a prior rea-
sonable appeal for change is a necessary condition to morally jus-
tify civil disobedience unless such an appeal would be fruitless or
unless the act were directed against an extreme case of injustice. 201
One may argue that from the animals' viewpoint, medical testing is
in fact an extreme case of injustice, thus falling within Rawls' ex-
ception justifying the use of disobedient acts without any prior ap-
peal for a change of law or policy.
D. Third Illustration
The facts here are the same as those in the basic fact pattern and
the first illustration, except that the STB members who engage in
the protest at the CDC headquarters have indicated that they con-
sider their actions to be immune from prosecution by the state, and
that they are therefore unwilling to accept any punishment that
might result from their actions. The issue raised is whether the
actors must willingly accept resultant punishment in order to jus-
tify their disobedient acts on moral grounds.20 2
For two of the five philosophers, namely, Thoreau and Rawls, a
disobedient's willingness to accept resultant punishment would
probably be a prerequisite to the moral justification of his or her
act. Thoreau does not expressly deal with this issue in his essay,
but one may reasonably infer from Thoreau's own actions that he
considers the willing acceptance of punishment to be a prerequisite
200. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
202. The late United States Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas believed that the actor
had to be willing to accept the punishment legally resulting from his or her illegal act of
nonviolent civil disobedience. Fortas wrote largely in response to the student protests of
the late 1960s against the Vietnam War, and according to his literal, rather simplistic
view, "[clivil disobedience is violation of law. Any violation of law must be punished,
whatever its purpose .. " ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDI-
ENCE 63 (1968). See also id. at 30.
Given his liberal judicial record on civil liberties, Fortas' views on civil disobedience
are surprisingly conservative. Fortas rejects justification of disobedient acts that break
the law, and he admits the moral justification of such acts only when they are aimed
directly at laws that are "basically offensive to fundamental values of life or the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 63. See also Fortas' beliefs as further discussed infra note 211. In espousing
such opinions on civil disobedience, Fortas fits the mold of those whom Dworkin identi-




to morally justifiable civil disobedience. °3 After all, Thoreau's
personal act of disobedience (the failure to pay his poll tax) re-
sulted in his punishment at the hands of the state, a punishment
that Thoreau readily accepted and indeed invited as integral to his
protest. 201 Rawls would also be likely to mandate STB's willing
submission to punishment as a condition precedent to the moral
justification of the protesters' acts.20 5 Therefore, under the views of
Thoreau and Rawls, STB's failure to submit to punishment may
make their action less morally justifiable.
For Dworkin, 2°e Greenawalt,207 and Raz, 20 8 the willingness to
accept punishment is not an absolute prerequisite to the moral jus-
tification of civil disobedience. Thus, none of the three would re-
quire the STB protesters to acquiesce willingly in any resultant
punishment, though for Greenawalt (particularly) such acquies-
cence could have significant prudential implications.
E. Fourth Illustration
In order to effectuate their protest, STB members secretly break
into CDC facilities one night and destroy records obtained from,
and equipment used in, animal testing. They leave an unsigned
note explaining that their actions were undertaken to protest the
use of live animals in the medical testing conducted by the CDC.
No one is physically injured as a result of STB's actions. The de-
struction is discovered the next morning and reported to the police
and the news media.
The two major variables introduced in this illustration are the
use of violent acts (destruction of property) as a means of protest 2°9
and the secret commission of the disobedient acts.210 The issues
203. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
204. See id. Recall that Thoreau viewed his punishment as so integral a part of his
protest that he was upset when his imprisonment was cut short without his consent.
205. See supra note 143.
206. See supra text accompanying note 166.
207. See supra notes 90-91.
208. See supra notes 44, 50 and accompanying text.
209. One may argue that STB's act of breaking into CDC facilities at night and de-
stroying property does not constitute violence per se, for the facts do not indicate that any
injury to persons, as opposed to property, occurred as a result of this act. However, since
an examination of the precise limits of the definition of violence is beyond the scope of
this essay, it will be assumed for present purposes that STB's act in this fourth illustration
does in fact constitute violent action.
210. This illustration may also raise questions about the actors' willingness to accept
punishment. This issue has already been adequately addressed in the third illustration
and will not be reexamined in either this or the fifth illustration. See supra notes 202-08
and accompanying text.
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raised are whether the moral justification for civil disobedience is
affected by a resort to violence211 and whether it is affected by the
secrecy of the acts.21 2
None of the five philosophers would hold that the use of violent
tactics by STB members necessarily rendered their disobedient acts
morally unjustified. Thoreau's thoughts regarding the use of vio-
lence are the most problematic for the simple reason that he does
not discuss this issue in On the Duty of Civil Disobedience. Nor
was his own act of protest reported in that essay considered a vio-
lent act.213 It is therefore difficult to surmise his thoughts on the
use of violence, based on that work alone. He may have believed,
however, that the use of violence would not, in and of itself, render
an act of protest morally unjustifiable.21 4
Rawls 2 5 and Greenawalt 21 6 exclude violent acts from their defi-
nitions of civil disobedience; however both view this exclusion as
definitional rather than conceptual. Neither Rawls 217 nor Greena-
walt 21s states that violence is never justified in order to effectuate a
change in a law or policy, but moral justification would depend on
the gravity of the challenged injustice. Raz expressly rejects the
view that a resort to violence necessarily disqualifies an act as mor-
ally justifiable.2 9  Dworkin, too, probably shares this belief.
220
Thus, under the beliefs of the five men treated in this essay, the use
of violence would not necessarily prevent STB's action from quali-
fying as morally justifiable civil disobedience. If the harm that re-
sulted from STB's actions (destruction of property) were less than
the harm that STB sought to change (the use of animals in medical
testing), perhaps discounted by the likelihood of such change actu-
211. Fortas found violent disobedience unjustifiable under any circumstances in a
democratic society. For him, "damage to persons or property is intolerable." FORTAS,
supra note 202, at 62. Under his view, the acts of the STB members in this fourth illus-
tration would constitute violence and would not be morally, let alone legally, justified.
212. Despite the unsigned note, one might argue that the acts in this fourth illustra-
tion were, in effect, openly committed, thus eliminating the openness issue. Nevertheless,
for purposes of this illustration, it is assumed that in leaving an unsigned note, STB was
not openly acknowledging commission of its acts and that neither the authorities nor the
public were in fact able to determine who engaged in this destruction of CDC property.
213. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 34.
215. See supra notes 134, 143-44 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying. note 75.
217. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
218. See GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS, supra note 4, ch. 11 passim.
219. See supra notes 52-53 and' accompanying text.
220. Dworkin does not discuss in any depth the use of violence in Taking Rights
Seriously. The assertion that he does not find violence a disqualification is largely inferen-
tial from his book. See DWORK1N, s upra note 4, at 196.
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ally taking place, then it appears that STB's acts could be morally
justifiable.
Much of what has been said about the willingness to accept pun-
ishment applies to the secrecy of STB's acts. Although Thoreau
does not directly deal with the openness issue, one might reason-
ably infer that he would view the open commission of the civilly
disobedient act as a prerequisite to morally justified civil disobedi-
ence. 22 1 Rawls is also likely to require openness as a prerequisite to
the moral justification of STB's acts.222
Dworkin, Greenawalt, and Raz would probably not require STB
to act openly or to acknowledge its acts in order to justify its diso-
bedience. In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin does not expressly
address this issue; however, in light of his rejection of the willing
acceptance of punishment as an element of morally justifiable civil
disobedience, it would seem somewhat illogical for him to insist on
openness as such an element. 223 Greenawalt acknowledges that, at
times, the effectiveness of disobedience will depend on its secrecy;
therefore, he rejects any categorical requirement of openness.224
For his part, Raz would require that the disobedient act be public,
though the actor's identity itself need not necessarily be made
known to the public at large.225 For Raz, STB's act would proba-
bly be justified, since the act, though originally committed in se-
cret, was publicized by the press, and the unidentified actors did
make their purpose clear.
F Fifth Illustration
To dramatize their beliefs, STB members, carrying signs decry-
ing the CDC's use of animals in medical testing, block one of the
city's major traffic intersections during rush hour on a business
day. As a result, traffic is delayed, and thousands of commuters
are inconvenienced, although no one is injured either directly or
indirectly.
The new issue raised is whether civilly disobedient acts must be
directed solely at the laws or policies that the actors seek to over-
turn. None of the legal philosophers discussed in this essay ap-
pears to believe that civil disobedience must be directed exclusively
221. One could draw this inference on the basis, again, of the circumstances sur-
rounding Thoreau's own act of protest. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
222. See supra text accompanying note 143.
223. See supra text accompanying note 166.
224. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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at the challenged law or policy. 226
Greenawalt believes that it may be easier to justify disobedient
acts on moral grounds when a close nexus exists between the acts
and the law or policy that is the ultimate target of the protest.227
Considering the nexus between STB's disobedient acts and the laws
broken, the moral justification for the civil disobedience here is
questionable. In the first three illustrations, STB's peaceful acts of
protest were directed at the major target of the protest, the CDC,
and bore a closer relationship to the challenged policy. There is
much less of a nexus between the tying-up of traffic and the chal-
lenged CDC policy. Furthermore, less disruptive, more direct
methods of protest exist. Therefore, Greenawalt would probably
not find STB's roadblock to be a morally justified form of civil
disobedience.228
IV. CONCLUSION
In a democratic and reasonably just society, what qualifies as
226. Thoreau does not directly address this issue in On the Duty of Civil Disobedience;
however, it is clear from Thoreau's own actions, as discussed in his essay, that he does
not believe in the necessity of directing civilly disobedient acts only at the challenged laws
or policies. Thoreau's personal act of disobedience, his refusal to pay his poll tax, was not
done in defiance of the poll tax itself but rather was undertaken in protest against the
federal government's policies of supporting slavery and engaging in a war with Mexico
(and against the Massachusetts government's support of the federal government). See
supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. Since the poll tax was collected for the benefit of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and not for that of the federal government itself
(whose policies Thoreau was protesting), it seems likely that Thoreau would reject any
absolute requirement that the protest target only the laws or policies to which the pro-
tester objects. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
Raz's rejection of this requirement is implicit in his discussion of the common defini-
tion of civil disobedience. See RAz, supra note 4, at 269; see also supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
For Rawls's explicit rejection of this condition, see RAWLs, supra note 4, at 364-65.
Fortas held a contrary view. He averred that "law violation directed not to the laws or
practices that are the subject of dissent, but to unrelated laws which are disobeyed merely
to dramatize dissent may be morally as well as politically unacceptable." FORTAS, supra
note 202, at 63. Judging from the context of this comment, along with that of similar
comments made by Fortas elsewhere in his pamphlet, it is reasonably certain that he
believed that disobedient acts not directed at the challenged laws or policies were, virtu-
ally always, morally unjustifiable. See id. at 31-32.
For Greenawalt's rejection of Fortas's categorical position on this point, see supra
notes 86-89 and 113-15 and accompanying text. Indeed, Greenawalt responds to Fortas
by name, both in A Contextual Approach to Civil Disobedience, and in Conflicts of Law
and Morality. Greenawalt, Disobedience, supra note 4, at 67-68, and GREENAWALT,
CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 235-36.
Dworkin does not specifically address this issue in Taking Rights Seriously.
227. See supra notes 86-89, 113-15 and accompanying text.
228. This would be true especially if other methods of protest were likely to be
equally as effective as the traffic tie-up in securing a change in the objectionable policy.
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morally justifiable, nonviolent civil disobedience? After examining
the relevant thinking of five important writers, it is possible to ar-
rive at a general definition of such disobedience, consisting of the
elements expressed most commonly (though not necessarily held
unanimously) by these individuals. By definition, the relevant act
must be nonviolent. This is not to say that violence is never justi-
fied, but merely that it is excluded from the definition of the type of
action examined in this Article. The act of disobedience must, of
course, be contrary to law and undertaken for the purpose of chal-
lenging one or more laws or government policies; among its per-
missible purposes is the raising of a test case.
As noted earlier, civil disobedience is not the same as conscien-
tious objection. Conscientious objection involves noncompliance
with a law that the actor finds morally or religiously unacceptable;
the actor's primary purpose is not to change the objectionable law.
Yet, it is certainly possible that in any number of instances, the
concepts of civil disobedience and conscientious objection will
overlap.229
The civilly disobedient act need not be aimed at the challenged
law or policy (this may even be virtually impossible in certain cir-
cumstances); however, a reasonably close nexus between the diso-
bedience and the challenged law or policy furthers the moral
justifiability of the act. The mere fact that the disobedience is un-
dertaken in a democratic and relatively just society does not render
it morally unjustifiable; yet, in such a society, disobedience should
be undertaken only after reasonable efforts have been made to
change the challenged law or policy through legal means.
The identity of the civil disobedient need not be made known to
the public, although, as a general rule, the fact that a disobedient
act has been committed should be disclosed so that the purpose of
the protest might be clear to all. While the actor need not be will-
ing to accept resulting punishment for the act, the actor's willing-
ness to do so may have beneficial effects, such as demonstrating the
actor's seriousness of purpose and limiting the scope of the act to
that which is absolutely necessary.
Finally, the civil disobedient should take reasonable steps to
minimize any physical harm to third parties and their property
that might result from his or her act. Inconvenience to third par-
ties, however, may often be a part of civil disobedience and may
229. Failure to register for the draft is one example of such an overlap: the person
who fails to register may well desire both to challenge the draft law by refusing to comply
and to avoid compliance on moral or religious grounds.
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appropriately heighten its impact. However, if grave enough, the
harm may render disobedience violent, thus removing it from the
type of action discussed in this essay.
In a relatively just society, the judicious use of nonviolent civil
disobedience can be an extremely effective and morally justified
weapon in the arsenal of those who seek to change laws or govern-
ment policies. In the United States, the civil rights movement of
the 1950s and 1960s and the antiwar movement of the 1960s and
1970s are recent examples of its power. In the current political
battles over such controversial issues as animal rights, abortion
rights, and nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, nonviolent
civil disobedience has been-and will probably continue to be-a
powerful tool.
